Here's a roundup of the 9 blogs I wrote or co-wrote for CGD last year.
August
September
October
November
December
Probably the best economics blog (founded) in South Sudan
Rwanda has the largest share of female parliamentarians of any country in the world. But things in Rwanda seldom sit still, and it is time to start going faster and further.
Rwanda’s impressive female representation in national politics is not yet replicated at the local level. Only eight of the thirty district mayors in Rwanda (twenty-seven percent) are women, and just thirteen percent of village leaders are women.Me in The Kigalian
"The international architecture for education is failing the world. There is little leadership; global priorities are obscure; the major debates are increasingly irrelevant and divorced from reality on the ground; the number of children out-of-school has stagnated for a decade; little progress has been made in tackling the global learning crisis; knowledge about what works in education is surprisingly limited; global public goods are massively underfunded; huge global financing requirements show little prospect of being met; and the neediest low-income countries, mainly in sub-Saharan Africa, do not receive the external financial and technical support necessary if they are to develop their education systems."Tell us what you really think Nicholas.
"the work of the Right to Education Initiative lobby and its recent Abidjan Principles, which would have governments place severe restrictions on private education."Points to a major problem being the decline of UNESCO:
"In the past, UNESCO could have been counted on to be the central voice advocating for education, including education as a human right, in international fora. UNESCO has become so weakened, however, by its internal politicization and inadequate budget, that it is no longer the respected international voice on education, rather just one of many rather weak voices. These problems preceded the withdrawal first of United States' financial support and, more recently, of US membership but these steps now mean that UNESCO cannot function effectively as it has insufficient resources. UNESCO’s total regular budget for education is now only $51 million per year."With a few other choice quotes:
"It is a real paradox that those working in international education increasingly (and rightly) call for systems-wide approaches but fail to study their own non-functional international architecture system.
...
It is astonishing both how little we know about what works in education and how poorly we disseminate what we do know.
...
If the situation is bad regarding generating knowledge, it is even worse regarding promoting innovation in education.
...
There is thus no systematic regular review of how the international architecture is performing."Well written and well worth reading in full.
"So should governments switch to frequent coaching sessions? Possibly, but the next step should first be to try this type of intervention at scale.
Finding three highly skilled coaches is one thing, but you might need hundreds or thousands of them if you were to run a similar programme across an entire country.
One potential route to scale is through new uses of technology. A study in Brazil found positive impacts of a virtual-coaching programme run via Skype, for example.
But perhaps the most straightforward type of technology to go for is scripts, which this paper suggests have positive effects on learning both when presented through centralised training and intensive coaching."
This post was first published on the Centre for Education Economics website.I blogged recently about a new RISE working paper by Annika Bergbauer, Eric Hanushek, and Ludger Woessmann, which finds that:
“standardized external comparisons, both school-based and student-based, is associated with improvements in student achievement.”William Smith pointed me to his rebuttal blog written with Manos Antoninis, which argues that there are “multiple weaknesses in their analysis that undermine their conclusions”.
“Our review of the evidence found that evaluative policies promoting school choice exacerbated disparities by further advantaging more privileged children (pp. 49-52).”This review of the evidence in pp 49-52 of the UNESCO Global Monitoring Report focuses on policies designed to promote school choice. But that is not at all the focus of the BHW analysis, which is on policies that allow for the comparison of schools and students with the purpose of incentivising greater effort. School choice doesn’t need to have anything to do with it. As BHW write:
“That is the focus of this paper: By creating outcome information, student assessments provide a mechanism for developing better incentives to elicit increased effort by teachers and students, thereby ultimately raising student achievement levels to better approximate the desires of the parents”Second, AS argue that
“punitive systems had unclear achievement effects but troublesome negative consequences, including removing low-performing students from the testing pool and explicit cheating (pp. 52-56).”As mentioned above, the proposed mechanism in BHW does not at all require a punitive system. BHW write
“accountability systems that use standardized tests to compare outcomes across schools and students produce greater student outcomes. These systems tend [my emphasis] to have consequential implications and produce higher student achievement than those that simply report the results of standardized tests.”Having said that, there are some flaws in the literature review cited by AS. This section first cites studies on four individual countries (US, Brazil, Chile, South Korea), without noting that there are significantly positive results from two of them. One of the two papers they cite on Brazil (IDados 2017) concludes that there was “a large, continuous improvement in all those years in both absolute and relative terms when compared to other municipalities in the Northeastern region and in Brazil as a whole ” and “it is very likely that [the reform] is at least partially responsible for the changes.” On Chile, a paper not cited as it was published in 2017 just after the review was completed (Murnane et al) found that “On average, student test scores increased markedly and income-based gaps in those scores declined by one-third in the five years after the passage of [the reform]”.
1. Standardized External Comparison
- “In your school, are assessments of 15-year old students used to compare the school to district or national performance?” (PISA)
- existence of national/central examinations at the lower secondary level (OECD, EAG)
- National exams (primary) (Euryadice (EACEA))
- Central exit exams end secondary (Leschnig, Schwerdt, and Zigova (2017))
2. Standardized Monitoring
- “Generally, in your school, how often are 15- year-old students assessed using standardized tests?” (PISA)
- “During the last year, have [tests or assessments of student achievement] been used to monitor the practice of teachers at your school?” (PISA)
- “In your school, are achievement data … tracked over time by an administrative authority[?]”
3. Internal testing
- whether assessments are used “to inform parents about their child’s progress.”
- use of assessments “to monitor the school’s progress from year to year.”
- “achievement data are posted publicly (e.g. in the media).” (vaguely phrased and is likely to be understood by school principals to include such practices as posting the school mean of the grade point average of a graduating cohort, derived from teacher-defined grades rather than any standardized test, at the school’s blackboard.)
4. Internal teaching monitoring
- whether assessments are used “to make judgements about teachers’ effectiveness.”
- practice of teachers is monitored through “principal or senior staff observations of lessons.”
- “observation of classes by inspectors or other persons external to the school” are used to monitor the practice of teachers.
Did you know what career you wanted to do when you were in secondary school? I didn’t. Most pupils make critically important choices that will affect their lives throughout their educational career, often on the basis of poor information about what those choices will mean for their future. In most countries, there is little transparency on the costs and benefits of pursuing education and information on the various career paths available.
In this paper, Ciro Avitabile and Rafael de Hoyos study whether or not providing pupils with better information about the earnings returns to education and the options available lead to greater effort and learning. Several studies have previously shown that providing information about the wage gains from schooling leads pupils to stay in school a bit longer, and affects their educational choices, but there is limited evidence that such information can affect learning per se, at least in a slightly longer-term perspective.
Public support in rich countries for global development is critical for sustaining effective government and individual action. But the causes of public support are not well understood. Temporary migration to developing countries might play a role in generating individual commitment to development, but finding exogenous variation in travel with which to identify causal effects is rare. In this paper I address this question using a natural experiment – the assignment of Mormon missionaries to two year missions in different world regions – and test whether the attitudes and activities of returned missionaries differ. Data comes from a unique survey gathered on Facebook. Missionaries assigned to treat regions (Africa, Asia, Latin America) are balanced with those assigned to the control region (Europe) on high school test scores and prior language and travel experience. Those assigned to the treatment region report greater interest in global development and poverty, but no difference in support for government aid or higher immigration, and no difference in personal international donations, volunteering, or other involvement.Here's the link to the paper and the twitter discussion.
"teachers tend to oppose standardised tests, partly because they perceive them to narrow the curriculum and crowd out wider learning. However, it is intuitive that the effects of testing could vary dramatically by context. Indeed, the impact may very well follow a so-called “Laffer curve”. At low levels of testing, an increase may lead to better performance as it provides relevant information and incentives to actors in the education system. Yet if there are already high levels of testing, further increases may very well decrease performance, due to stress, for example, or the effects of an overly-narrowed curriculum. If so, we should expect the impact of testing to follow an inverted U-curve – or at the very least display diminishing returns. Furthermore, the impact of tests is also likely to depend on exactly how they are used in the education system.
This paper provides perhaps the first systematic evidence on these issues"
"the main takeaway is that neither intervention (when evaluated at the low Gikuriro cost of $141 per household) improved child outcomes." Yikes. I guess though if household size = 7 that is only $20 per person.Should we really be surprised that giving someone $20 doesn't improve any measurable outcomes? Maybe Kevane's maths is wrong and household size is smaller, but $20 is so small we could double it and still not expect to see anything.